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The new Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate the new Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers that has been in operation since 2009. The article draws heavily on Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) and the approach followed is fundamentally descriptive: the objective is to understand how the new system works for the fifteen "common regime" autonomous communities to which it applies 2 and how it differs from previous arrangements.
Since they were established in 1980's, intergovernmental transfers in Spain have aimed at the equalisation of resources per unit of need, so that the same service level could be provided by all autonomous communities irrespective of their fiscal capacity.
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The definition of expenditure needs and the identification of differences among communities regarding the cost of service provision have been the main areas of discussion between central and autonomous governments. The provisions regarding the growth of transfers have also come into scrutiny due to the lack of connexion between the variation of needs and that of resources. 4 The reform that we analyse here addresses these questions and leads to improvements in both respects that, although not complete, we deem significant. communities, which meets regularly to discuss issues concerning the regular operation of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Subsequently, this agreement was given legal status through the modification of the LOFCA (BOE, 2009a) and the enactment of a national law setting the different provisions of the system (BOE, 2009b) . 5 The Law makes a complex and unnecessarily circular presentation of the new model. The best way to untangle the effective workings of the system is to compare the basic structure of both new and old models, and go directly to the final distribution of resources that each of them generates. This approach allows us to distinguish elements that play an important role from those that are secondary.
We identify aspects of the reform that in our opinion could be improved, but we abstain from advancing normative proposals. For instance, we find unsatisfactory the way in which the index of needs enters into the model, but we leave out from this paper any suggestion of improvement on this particular aspect. 6 With this, we intend to avoid as much as possible controversial issues and, in a purely positive vein, concentrate on actual legal provisions.
In addition to identifying formally the workings of the model, the article quantifies empirically its different elements. Using empirical data from the period 2004-2007, the article presents an estimation not only of the starting position of the model, which we call year zero, but also of the growth that the system would undergo during the following five years of application. 7 The new model narrows significantly the dispersion of resources per capita between autonomous communities and takes into account the temporal variation of needs. On the other hand, its cost -an overall increase of resources of over 12 per cent -is by far the largest of the five major revisions undergone by the system. In terms of the overall increase of resources, we estimate that the costs of the other four reforms were as follows: 1987: 6.9 per cent; 1992: 6.1 per cent; 1997: 0 per cent; and 2002: 3.5 per cent. 5 In the rest of this article, the legal text that contains the model is called the "Law". This model is referred to interchangeably as the "present" or "new" model as opposed to the substituted system, which is referred to as the "previous" or "old" model. 6 We do this in a separate paper: López-Laborda and . 7 The Law states that the model should be reviewed every five years.
There are several articles in Spanish that cover approximately the same ground (De la Fuente, 2009; Bosch, 2010a; 8 López-Laborda, 2010; López-Laborda and Zabalza, 2010; Zabalza and López-Laborda, 2010) but we feel that an additional account in English will be useful for the international reader interested in this subject. In comparison with the first two papers noted above, this paper pays more attention to the growth of resources and differs from them in its interpretation of the distribution structure that the model implies.
The next section shows the extent of decentralization in Spain and in this context
anticipates the overall effects of the model that will be described in subsequent sections.
Section 3 presents the formal structure of the new model. Section 4 compares the distribution of resources it generates with that of the old model. Section 5 describes a particular element of the model, the guarantee fund for fundamental public services, that serves as the main base for the introduction of the index of needs, and to which the Law attaches special importance. We show that despite this emphasis, this fund plays no role in the distribution of resources in year zero. Section 6 describes the dynamics of the model and shows the way in which the temporal variation of needs is taken into account, while Section 7 empirically simulates the growth of the system over a five year period. Whereas the guarantee fund does not enter into the definition of year zero, it has an effect on how resources received by each autonomous community vary over time.
This is discussed in Section 8. The paper ends with a section of conclusions.
The extent of decentralization in Spain
As Table 1 shows, in 1979, the year that the Spanish system of autonomous communities was put into operation, 91 per cent of total public expenditure was undertaken by the central government and the social security system, a negligible 0.1 per cent by all autonomous communities, and 8.9 per cent by provinces and municipalities. In 2007, the last year for which final compiled figures exist for the three jurisdictions, the percentages were: 50 per cent for central government and social security, 35.9 per cent for autonomous communities and 14.1 per cent for provinces and municipalities. In the 28 years elapsed, the share of regional public expenditure has increased by 35.8 percentage points. The degree of decentralization in resources is less 8 A shortened version of this paper in English can be found in Bosch (2010b) .
pronounced but still important: in 1979, 92.9 per cent of public resources were essentially national taxes and social security contributions, and the remaining 7.1 per cent municipal taxes, provinces having virtually no own taxes. In 2007, national taxes and social security contributions represented only 67.9 per cent of total resources, ceded and own regional taxes 21.9 per cent, and municipal taxes 10.2 per cent. As will be shown in this paper, the new model changes the structure between tax revenue and overall cash transfer in favour of tax revenue, and increases significantly the total amount of resources received by the fifteen "common regime" autonomous communities". As Table 2 shows, in 2010 we estimate that in the old model assessed revenue from ceded taxes (i.e., regional tax capacity) would have represented 69.1 per cent of total resources and cash transfer 30.9 per cent. In the new model, on the other hand, we estimate that the share of assessed tax revenue rises to 78.7 per cent, while that of the transfer falls to 21.3 per cent. In the new model, therefore, assessed tax revenue increases its share in total resources by 9.6 percentages points.
We estimate that in 2010, the old model would have put at the disposal of autonomous communities a total amount of resources equivalent to 9.5 per cent of GDP.
In the new model we estimate that this percentage will rise to 10.7. The new model thus adds resources to the system of regional finance to the tune of 1.2 per cent of GDP.
These resources are all of them added by means of a significant enlargement of ceded taxes, which, assessed at standard values, 9 will contribute fresh money to autonomous communities equivalent to 1.8 per cent of GDP. Cash transfers, on the other hand, will drop by 0.7 percent of GDP. The 1.2 per cent of GDP is a net increase in resources, to the extent that expenditure responsibilities of autonomous communities remain unchanged as compared with those they had under the old system. The outcome is the result of a protracted process of negotiations between central government and the fifteen regional governments, which took place during the initial phase of the most severe fall in real product that the Spanish economy has had to endure since the 1936 civil war. We do not have a satisfactory explanation of this outcome, nor is this explanation the purpose of this paper. Beyond the obvious fact that it represents a remarkable feat of regional governments, we can only point out that the increase in resources must have been, at least to some extent, the answer to the mounting difficulties that regional governments had to maintain service levels in the health and education systems, both under the responsibilities of autonomous communities.
The basic structure of the model
Since they were established in the early eighties, intergovernmental transfers in Spain have aimed at the equalisation of resources per unit of need, so that the same service level could be provided by all autonomous communities irrespective of their fiscal capacity. The total amount of resources that at the base year   0 t  the system would effectively put under the command of a given community, 10 and therefore the expenditure that it could undergo, 0 P i E , was equal to the tax revenue actually obtained out of the transferred fiscal base (the "ceded taxes"), 
The transfer, 0 P i S , was defined as those resources that normatively the system would assign to the community,
, minus the revenue that for a given standard tax policy the system would assess that community i could obtain from the transferred fiscal base,
10 In this article we consider only system-related resources. In addition to these resources, the community may obtain other resources from own taxes, debt and other commercial and economic operations. For a recent review of the Spanish regional finance system, see López-Laborda and Monasterio (2007) . We index variables of the "previous model" with the superscript P.
11 The transfer is defined in terms of assessed rather than actual revenue to introduce an incentive for communities to manage diligently their ceded tax basis. Otherwise, whatever the amount of tax revenue obtained by the community, the system would always cover the gap between actual tax revenue and normative resources. Regarding the main ceded taxes (Personal Income Tax -PIT -, VAT and Excises), plus Vehicle Excises, Hydrocarbon Retail Sales Tax and Electricity Tax, standard revenue is the same as actual revenue in each community excluding the rise or fall in revenues originated by normative changes in national tax rates enacted by each community by virtue of its legal powers (autonomous communities have practically no powers concerning the definition of tax basis). Regarding traditional ceded taxes (Inheritance and Gift Tax, Capital Transfer Tax, Stamp Duties and Gaming Taxes), in the year in which the tax is ceded standard revenue is the same as actual revenue in that year. Subsequently, this initial standard revenue is updated according to a common rate of growth for all communities, related to the variation of revenue from State taxes, called ITE and which we describe in more detail below. In the last reform (2009), the updating rate applied to the Capital Transfer Tax is no longer the common ITE rate, but a sort of community specific ITE related to the variation of regional revenue from PIT, VAT and Excises.
Substituting 2 into 1, we obtain the expression that shows the essential nature of the previous model:
The resources that the system would effectively put under the command of community i, 
we can see that in the old system total resources were the sum of actual tax revenue obtained from the ceded tax base, 
and, to the extent that normative resources are distributed among communities according to needs, the system would equalise resources per unit of need for all communities.
We show in this paper that the basic structure of the new model is exactly the same as that of the old model. 13 As with the previous model, actual resources, 
where assessed tax revenue is a primary element and the guarantee fund a derived element 15 . The text of the Law puts a lot of emphasis on the guarantee fund. The Law refers to this fund as the source of resources that should cover the cost of fundamental services (health, education and social services), and distributes it among communities by means of an index of needs -Adjusted Population -so that resources per unit of need (according to this index) are the same for all communities. We return to the guarantee fund in Section 5, below.
14 The complete names of the first two elements are: the "Guarantee Fund for Fundamental Public Services Transfer" and the "Global Sufficiency Fund". In what follows we will use the shortened version of both names. For the Competitiveness and Cooperation Funds, the Law also uses the generic term "Convergence Funds"; occasionally, we shall make use of this generic form.. 15 The total amount of the guarantee fund is defined as 75 per cent of total assessed tax revenue plus a given quantity called by the Law "State Contribution". See Section 5 below.
The Sufficiency Fund is defined as the difference between, on the one hand, the sum of resources of the previous system, which the model calls Status Quo, 
From expression 11 two interesting results follow: First, the guarantee fund transfer, and with it the guarantee fund, cancel out of the system. Despite the emphasis put by the Law, the guarantee fund plays no role in determining the overall transfer in year zero, nor in its distribution among communities. Second, the basic structure of the new model is essentially the same as that of the old model. This can be seen by comparing expression 11 with 7 and 2. They have exactly the same structure and the only difference refers to the definition of the resources that the system normatively assigns to each community, which in the new model is
Also, substituting 12 into 6, we obtain
As in the old model, community i commands a given amount of resources normatively assigned by the system (the four terms enclosed in the first parenthesis of the expression), plus/minus an amount of resources that depend on whether the community applies a tax policy which generates more or less tax revenue than that assessed for the standard tax policy. If the community tax policy is the standard, the last parenthesis cancels out; if the community applies a more strict tax policy than the standard, it benefits from the resulting increase in revenues and the transfer is not reduced; finally, if the tax policy applied by the community is more lax than the standard, the transfer remains the same but the community bears the resulting fall in tax revenues.
Alternatively, rewriting 13 as
we have the equivalent to expression 4 in the previous model. Actual resources are equal to actual tax revenue plus/minus the equalising cash transfer, which in the new model is given by the expression in square brackets.
In all cases, for a tax policy equal to the standard,
, which is the assumption we follow in the rest of the paper, the resources the system puts into the hands of community i,
given by expression 12. Again, in year zero the guarantee fund plays no role in the determination of resources or in its distribution among communities.
The way in which needs are introduced into the system is the same as that of the old model. In the old model, the relative structure of needs and differences in the cost of providing services among communities was taken into account through the term although not in the initial distribution, does play a role in the variation of resources over time, as will be seen in Section 6 below.
It is important to point out from the outset that despite the different labels attached to each of the four elements of expression 12, all resources are unconditional and their budgetary allocation on various expenditures depends exclusively on the autonomous community, providing basic national regulations on public service standards are fulfilled. The particular labels attached to the four terms of 12 must be seen simply as a way to motivate the different distribution rules of each of them. In the next section we evaluate empirically expression 12 over the whole set of communities to gain an idea of the extent to which fresh resources have been added into the system and how they have been distributed. Table 3 shows the estimated values of the four elements of expression 12 at year zero, which under the assumptions used in the simulation corresponds to 2010. We take 2010 as the starting point of the model, as this is the year in which all fresh resources will have accrued and, thus, the year that best measures the complete effect of the reform. (2010) The first column gives the status quo, is uniform for all communities. These assumptions are also used to update the status quo. The simulation exercise presented here is largely illustrative and numerical results should be seen under the light of these assumptions.
Old and new models
18 Strictly, the resources of the old model would be slightly less (0.4 per cent less than 0 SQ ) due to the incidence in the status quo of the compensation for the elimination of the Wealth Tax. The difference is very small and its effect on the distribution negligible; so we take 0 i SQ as representative of the resources that the old model would have generated in 2010 (see Zabalza and López-Laborda, 2010) .
Column 2 shows the value of 0 i AR , which amounts to a total of €7,400 million. This figure comes from the Law, which specifies that €5,000 million will be first contributed in 2009 and €2,400 million added in 2010. We assume that inflation between these two years is nil, and therefore use the nominal figures given in the Law. to a special complement. Baleares is the only community that fits these conditions, and the complement received is €65 million.
At year zero, and for a tax policy equal to the standard, the new system adds €11,238 million over and above the resources that the fifteen communities would have 19 Notice that these figures, as well as those of the convergence funds, are given by the Law in nominal terms (that is, in Euros of the specified years). These nominal values were agreed before the full extent of the 2008-2010 shock was really known, a circumstance which clearly inflates the relative importance of the amount of fresh resources that the new model adds to the system. 20 The communities eligible to the competitiveness fund are those with resources (excluding convergence funds) per adjusted inhabitant (the unit of the Adjusted Population index of needs) below the mean or below an index of fiscal capacity. The communities eligible to the cooperation fund are those which are relatively poor, or have low demographic density or low population growth.
obtained with the old system; a 12.2 per cent increase. Although 89.1 per cent of total resources are driven by the old model, fresh resources are not distributed as the status quo. This is the case with the convergence funds, whose rules of eligibility are clearly income oriented, but to some extent it also happens with the so called additional resources, AR. Lastly, the bias of the competitiveness fund in favour of relatively rich communities is only partially compensated by the bias of the cooperation fund in favour of relatively poor communities, as the first fund distributes 2.6 per cent of all resources versus 1.2 per cent the second fund. Due to the different size of communities, the comparison between old and new models is best done in terms of resources standardized by some normalizing factor. Table 4 shows in columns 1 and 2 resources per capita of respectively the old and new models. 21 The old model distributes on average €2,175 per capita, with a coefficient of variation (CV) around this mean of 11.1 per cent, while the new model distributes more money, €2,441 per capita, and much more uniformly -a CV of 7.7 per cent. 21 The autonomous community inhabitants, 0 i H , used in Table 4 correspond to 2007 and are taken from the agreed final document of the Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera (MEH, 2009b) . The data are shown in Table 6 (column 1) below. Table 4 The new model, therefore, significantly flattens the distribution of resources per capita around the mean. In the old model the distribution ranges from Cantabria that gets 23.8 per cent more resources per capita than the mean, to Baleares that gets 11.9
per cent less -a difference of 35.7 percentage points. In the new model the two 
The Guarantee Fund
We now return to the guarantee fund. Substituting 9 into 8, and the resulting expression into 7, we obtain another expression of normative resources, this time as a function of the guarantee fund: Table 5 evaluates empirically expression 15. The new elements that appear in this decomposition are those shown in columns 1 to 3, while columns 4 to 6 are the same as the corresponding ones in Table 3 . For all communities, the fourth part of assessed tax revenue, as column 1 shows, equals €20,307 million, which implies that total assessed tax revenue is €81,228 million. The new model significantly enlarges the share of communities into the main tax bases. In terms of assessed revenue, the shares go from 33 to 50 per cent in PIT; from 35 to 50 per cent in VAT; and from 40 to 58 per cent in Excises. A key difference between the PIT and the VAT is that the autonomous 22 The big gain experienced by Baleares is in part a consequence of the Third Additional Provision of the Law discussed above, which gives this community a complement of €65 million. This represents a 39.4 per cent increase of the resources this community would be entitled to without such complement (€156 million). It should also be noted that Canarias, due to its particular geographical situation, has a special economic and fiscal regime that yields resources additional to those obtained from the system described here.
communities must each set their rate for their 50% of PIT as of 2011 but have no say with respect to the VAT. revenue, therefore, gains 9.6 percentage points in the structure of resources (see Table 2 above). Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) The aggregate figure for the guarantee fund is defined as 75 per cent of total assessed tax revenue, Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) Column 2 of Table 5 shows the result of distributing among communities the total amount of the guarantee fund according to the AP index of needs shown in Table 6 .
0 i GF could be seen as a measure of what the new model considers the expenditure needs for fundamental services. However, it must be kept in mind that all resources, those needed to finance fundamental services and those needed to finance the rest of services, are unconditional. The fact that the model assigns, say, €17,563 million to Catalunya, of which €11,582 million are in principle provided for fundamental services, is a choice that does not generate any practical obligation for the Catalan government. Nor does the model contain any mechanism that will insure that the Catalan government will use these €11,582 million on fundamental services, nor would the Catalan government agree with such mechanism as it would seriously impair the legally granted expenditure autonomy it enjoys.
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This is an important point in order to understand the distribution structure of the new model in year zero, and it is therefore convenient to elaborate further on the role played by the guarantee fund. From the description so far, we have two ways of representing the amount of resources that, for a standard tax policy, the system puts under the command of communities: expressions 12 and 15, which for convenience we repeat here. We may state, as the Law seems keen to pretend, that a part of total resources, namely the guarantee fund, is distributed according to the index AP. But then, the rest must be distributed in such a way that all resources respect the distribution implicit in expression 12. This can be seen perhaps more clearly, adding and subtracting 
The fact that the Law identifies a portion of resources, calls it guarantee fund and distributes it according to the AP index, does not alter the overall distribution of resources. The guarantee fund will effectively be distributed according to AP, but the parenthesis in expression 18 will be distributed so that the effect of AP in the system is neutralized and the joint distribution of the four primary elements in 12 emerges again.
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After year zero, however, the guarantee fund has an influence on resources because, according to the rules that determine the growth of the system, the distribution of the sufficiency fund gets fixed in year zero and ceases to act as an equalising mechanism in subsequent years; it simply grows according to the ITE rate of growth that we define in the next section, which is common to all communities. Thus, the way in which in year zero resources (net of the two convergence funds) are partitioned between (25 per cent of) assessed tax revenue, guarantee fund and sufficiency fund matters for the distribution of resources among communities in subsequent years. In the following two sections we turn to the issue of how the system grows over time and evaluate how much 25 López-Laborda and Zabalza (2010) use this argument to define a global index of needs for all the resources of the system. the size of the guarantee fund matters for the variation of the distribution of resources over time.
Growth of resources
In the previous model, the growth of resources between years 0 and t followed a very simple set of rules: assessed tax revenue, 
where the cash transfer is the block of terms contained in the square brackets.
The outcome of the above growth rules is that, for the new model, the rate of growth of total resources is a weighted average of i  and the rate of growth of the terms contained in the square brackets of 23, which itself is a composite result from applying these rules to each of its six elements. That is,
If we call the growth factor associated to the cash transfer1 
Empirical simulation

Methodology and data
The simulation methodology can be described as follows: First, empirical data for of growth for each concept is estimated, and this rate is used as the average annual rate over the whole simulated quinquennium. The years 2004 to 2007 correspond to a period of cyclical expansion and this explains, despite the averaging, the relatively high growth rates used in the estimation. However, it is considered preferable to work with empirical rather than with hypothetical data. This choice may influence absolute effects but, as with the estimates of year zero, should make little difference to relative effects, which are the main object of the exercise.
Second, despite working with average annual rates, the five years of the quinquennium are simulated. 27 This is done to obtain a more realistic profile of the annual growth of the convergence funds. Because of the eligibility rules, this profile turns out to be specific to each community and subject to potential discontinuities. Had the simulation restricted the period of interest to only one year (or equivalently to the whole of the quinquennium), these particularities would have gone unnoticed. Zabalza and López-Laborda (2010) As can be seen in column 4, total needs are assumed to grow at an annual average rate of 1.6 per cent. Valencia, Baleares and Murcia are the three communities with the largest growth of needs, and Asturias, Extremadura and Galicia the three communities with the smallest growth. Of the seven need indicators, all of them vary over time except area, dispersion and insularity.
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The ITE annual growth rate is 10.9 per cent,   
Results
The growth of the system is obtained by applying these rates of growth to the procedure described in Section 6 above. Table 9 shows the figures for the last year of the quinquennium. Assessed tax capacity grows at an average annual rate of 9.7 per cent. The guarantee fund grows at a rate of 9.9 per cent, which is a weighted average of the rate of growth of assessed tax revenue (9.7 per cent) and the ITE growth rate (10.9 per cent). The sufficiency and cooperation funds both grow at the ITE rate (10.9 per cent) and the competitiveness fund somewhat less, 10.4 per cent, due to fact that in the last year of the quinquennium Baleares is no longer eligible for the Third Additional Provision. The overall result is that total resources grow 9.9 per cent per year. Regarding individual results, the set of communities that benefits from the competitiveness fund remains stable during the whole quinquennium, while that of the cooperation fund experiences the addition of Canarias, which becomes eligible in the second year. The complex rules of eligibility, thus, generate a very particular and variable pattern of distribution. The economic logic of the eligibility rules of the competitiveness fund is not apparent from the text of the Law, but the final outcome suggests that this instrument somewhat compensates those (mostly rich) communities that were worst treated by the old model. The logic of the cooperation fund is more familiar, but a doubt remains whether this fund is an instrument of regional policy rather than an element of an equalising system of intergovernmental grants. Overall, judging from the way these funds work, they seem designed to satisfy particular demands of communities.
The implementation and management of the new model will not be easy. To take into account the temporal variation of needs adds an evident complication to the model, but this is amply compensated by the closer response of resources to changes in communities' socio-demographic characteristics. Given the structural nature of needs and the gradual way in which they change, we should not expect great differences between provisional and final transfers, although the period in which provisional transfers become final will inevitably lengthen. The biggest management problem will be that of the two convergence funds and, particularly, that of the competitiveness fund.
The eligibility conditions and the adjustments contemplated by the model depend on the variation of economic and demographic variables, the evolution of which is sometimes measured with significant delays. The potential exit of some community after having received provisional transfers during perhaps several years, may pose non negligible difficulties.
29 Table 10 compares, in per capita terms, base and last year of the quinquennium and Figure 2 presents the relative gain of each community over this period in an ordered fashion. The most noticeable feature is the widening of the distribution: the coefficient 29 Although not considered in the Law, a subsequent public statement from the Spanish Economics and Finance Minister, Ms. Salgado, seems to suggest that the usual procedure consisting of provisional advances followed by final payments will not be available in the case of convergence funds, and that the corresponding transfers will be made only when the final figures can be assessed. As compared with expectations held by communities and based on the text of the Law, this would impose a severe delay in the perception of resources. However, it remains to be seen what will be the practical consequences of this statement. of variation goes from 7.7 per cent in year zero to 9.1 per cent in year five. In part, this is due to the loss in year five of the special complement received by Baleares during the previous four years as a result of the Third Additional Provision (see note 21 above), but even without Baleares the coefficient of variation would increase from 7.9 per cent to 8.7 per cent. Communities than gain with the new model are the ones that tend to loose with the passing of time and vice versa. The pattern of growth, therefore, eliminates in part the gains in uniformity obtained with the new model. Uniformity may not be a sufficiently strong criterion on which to judge the adequacy of the rules of growth of the system, but the new model comes out with results that in principle seem to go against its purported objective to take into account the temporal change of needs. Asturias and Galicia, the two communities whose increase in resources per capita over time is the largest, are also the ones whose needs grow the least; while Baleares and Valencia, the two communities in which resources grow the least, are both of them the ones with the highest growth of needs. . Based on the equality of these two rates of growth for all communities, these authors propose a growth mechanism that maintains horizontal equity over time. Table 11 8. Influence of the guarantee fund on resources after year zero In Section 5 above we show that, in year zero, the guarantee fund has no influence on total resources or in the distribution of these resources among communities. We point out as well that, due to the growth mechanism posited by the model, the size of the guarantee fund does have an influence on the distribution of resources in subsequent years. Here we address the question of evaluating empirically the extent of this influence. This is an interesting question on its own, and it is also useful to understand further the growth mechanism and the results obtained in Table 9 . Given that assessed tax revenue, the guarantee fund transfer and the sufficiency fund do not depend on the two convergence funds, 31 we concentrate on resources net of these two funds; we call this concept "resources before funds", RBF. Subtracting the two convergence funds from 8 and using 7, the definition of 0 i RBF is:
Subtracting the two convergence funds from 12, we find that, in terms of primary variables, resources before funds is also the sum of the status quo and additional resources, 0 0 0 .
Expressions 26 and 27 show the basic identity of the new model: resources before funds are the status quo plus additional resources (expression 27), which, in terms of the channels trough which communities receive funds, can also be expressed as the sum of assessed tax revenue, guarantee fund transfer and sufficiency fund (expression 26). The right hand side of both expressions must always be equal. Therefore, given that the status quo and additional resources are exogenous (primary) variables, the partition of resources between tax revenue, guarantee fund transfer and sufficiency fund cannot be independent of each other. We may label a part of resources as guarantee fund transfer, and indeed this part may be anything we want. But then tax revenue and the sufficiency fund will adjust themselves so that the basic identity
continues to hold.
Using 10, expression 26 can be rewritten as:
To see what influence labelling has on the resources of community i, let us introduce a partition parameter k   0 k  , 32 such that 31 Although the opposite is not true, since the two convergence funds do depend on the sum of tax revenue, guarantee fund transfer and sufficiency fund. 32 In the text we only consider two cases: 0 and 1 kk  . The argument however is completely general and allows for any value of k smaller or greater than 1.These would correspond respectively to amounts 
Expression 29 is valid for any k and shows that if the guarantee fund increases (k rises), both assessed tax revenue and the sufficiency fund (the expression in square brackets) must decrease so that identity 28 is maintained. Two special cases of interest are when 0 k  (there is no labelling) and when 1 k  (the amount of resources labelled as guarantee fund is the one given by the new model).
Comparing 30 and 31 we see again that the guarantee fund is completely neutral regarding resources in year zero: whatever the value of k, resources before funds will always be equal to the sum of status quo and additional resources.
However, given the growth rules described above, this is not the case for subsequent 
of the guarantee fund transfer (and therefore of the guarantee fund) respectively smaller and greater than the particular amount specified in the Law.
growth rates is 0.64. The guarantee fund also favours communities with a relatively high weighted difference between the ITE and revenue growth rates. The association in this case is not as strong as in the case of needs; the correlation coefficient between one year elasticities and the weighted difference ITE minus tax revenue growth rates is 0.31. 
Final remarks
The reform of the Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers takes as its starting point the resources distributed by the old model (the Status Quo), and adds to this point fresh resources by means of the so called additional resources and the two convergence funds. The status quo represents 89.1 per cent of total resources. Despite that, the distribution is significantly different from that of the old model: it is much less dispersed and there are important changes in the effects upon particular communities.
That is, the distribution of fresh resources contributed to the system is not neutral with respect the distribution of the status quo.
In the distribution of the so called additional resources, adjusted population and its growth play an important role and this benefits communities such as Murcia, Baleares, Canarias, Madrid, Valencia and Catalunya, which in the old model were not particularly well treated. These are also the communities that benefit from the competitiveness fund, which in that sense reinforces the distributive effect of additional resources. Finally, the cooperation fund, although it counteracts somewhat these two effects, is not big enough to cancel them completely. The final result is a significant flattening of the distribution of resources per capita (a reduction of the coefficient of variation from 11.1 to 7.7 per cent) and a relative improvement of the financial position of these richer communities.
The new model is rather obscure concerning the distribution structure it implies. The model gives a great deal of importance to the guarantee fund and to the adjusted population index of needs that distributes this fund among communities. But given the unconditional nature of resources, it is difficult to see why this importance is granted and what purpose it serves. The guarantee fund and its distribution play no role in the definition of year zero. In year zero, total resources and their distribution are completely determined by the status quo, the so called additional resources and the two convergence funds.
The paper also examines the growth structure of resources that the new model implies. The variation of total resources over time is essentially driven by a combination of the rate of growth of total tax revenue and the ITE growth rate. Concerning individual communities, the variation of about 20 per cent of resources (those corresponding to 25 per cent of assessed tax revenue) is driven by the growth of the community's assessed tax revenue; that of 69 per cent of resources (guarantee plus competitiveness funds) is again driven by a combination of total tax revenue and ITE growth rates, but takes also into account the variation of needs; and finally, the variation of the remaining 11 per cent (sufficiency plus cooperation funds) is driven by the ITE growth rate. Although the labelling of a part of total resources as guarantee fund does not matter as far as the definition of year zero, it plays a role in the temporal variation of the distribution of resources. It favours, in particular, communities with high rates of growth of needs, and vice versa. The effect, however, is relatively small. Despite that, we believe that to gain a proper understanding of the workings of the model, of the relative weight of each of its variables and of the potential problems that the rules of eligibility of the two convergence funds may pose, it is important to empirically quantify the system. The numerical results of the simulation are naturally subject to the assumptions we have made regarding the fall in tax revenue up to 2010 -which will determine the initial values of the model at that year -and the annualized rates of growth of revenue and needs used to simulate the rest of quinquennium.
Of the five major revisions of the system, this reform is the most expensive. It is not clear that the return per euro invested is particularly high. On the positive side we have a significant reduction in the dispersion of the distribution of resources per capita. On the negative side: the system has become complex and obscure regarding the distribution criteria it uses; its growth mechanism opens the possibility that relative positions change over time, and this that may be contested by communities; and, finally, it may pose significant management problems, particularly regarding potential discontinuities in the membership of the convergence funds. The main technical shortcomings of the model are, on the one hand, an explicit index of needs applicable to all resources and, on the other, a growth mechanism that, subject to the change of needs, keeps the year zero distribution unchanged. To practically overcome these shortcomings we will have to wait until the next reform, but the analysis of normative proposals on these issues opens an interesting agenda of future work for the academic community. 
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